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IS TITLE VII'S REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
REQUIREMENT A LAW "RESPECTING AN
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION"?
I. Introduction
In July 1967, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
issued revised guidelines on religious discrimination.1 Like the previous guidelines, the new ones, contained in § 1605.1, expressed the Commission's view
that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds encompassed an obligation
on the part of the employer to make an effort to accommodate the religious needs
of his employees. The EEOC was specifically concerned about employees who
refused to work certain days for religious reasons. The 1966 guidelines had
maintained that an employer had the right to establish a normal work schedule,
even though it did not uniformly affect the religious practices of all employees.
This meant, for example, that an employer who closed his business on Sunday
was not discriminating merely because he required all his employees to be available for work on Saturday.' The 1967 revision omitted this language, and
placed upon the employer the burden of showing that a reasonable accommodation had been made.
Judicial opinions questioned the validity of the EEOC's new interpretation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was argued that the guidelines were inconsistent with the purpose of the Act, since Congress had intended to regulate only
discriminatory practices, and failure to make accommodations was not a discriminatory practice.' Congress clarified its intention in 1972 when it added the
following definition to the 1964 Act:
(j) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.4
The potential impact of this section is substantial. It may mean that an
employer must attempt to negotiate a new arrangement with a union where the
present employment contract requires scheduling a worker for the days objected
to on religious grounds.5 It may mean that an employer must violate a labor
contract by assigning more senior employees to Saturday work.6 The language
"all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief" is broad
enough to protect employees who object to making particular products, or to
1 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1973).
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31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1970) (dictum), a'e
by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); see Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F.
583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), reu'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(j) (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
See Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
See Scott v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 7 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1030 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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shaving, or to joining a union in a closed shop.' The validity and effect of this
requirement is therefore of interest to private employers.
The section was constitutionally challenged in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.8
After the Parker Seal Company discharged Paul Cummins for failure to work
scheduled Saturdays, he filed a complaint alleging religious discrimination.
Cummins claimed the protection of the reasonable accommodations requirement,
since he had religious reasons for refusing Saturday work. The Sixth Circuit
reversed the lower court decision against Cummins, holding that the reasonable
accommodations requirement did not violate the establishment clause, and that
the company had failed to show that it had met its obligation. The majority
argued that the section merely "put teeth in the existing prohibition against religious discrimination." 9
While the Supreme Court has not addressed this specific question, there is
a substantial body of decisions dealing with other establishment clause challenges.
The Court has developed well-recognized guidelines for evaluating such questions.
To survive this objection a statute must: (a) avoid excessive entanglement
between government and religion; (b) have a secular legislative purpose; and
(c) have a principal or primary effect which is neutral regarding religion."
Applying these standards to the reasonable accommodations requirement, the
following conclusions appear justified. First, the requirement does not threaten
excessive entanglement since it causes only minimal church-state contact. Second,
the purpose behind the requirement is constitutionally questionable since its
sponsor was primarily concerned with the plight of certain religious organizations.
Third, whatever its purpose, it results in government-enforced preferential treatment of certain groups on religious grounds which is not necessary to preserve
the right to free exercise. This effect is impermissible under the decided cases,
and therefore the constitutionality of the accommodations requirement is
doubtful.
II. Excessive Entanglement
A law which fosters excessive entanglement between government and religion violates the establishment clause regardless of its purpose and effect." The
Court has found this objectionable entanglement in two contexts. Administrative
entanglement, the first, occurs when a state program produces continuing, comprehensive, and discriminating contact between government and religious organizations. The second form of entanglement, potential political disruption, results
when legislation threatens to divide the voters in states or local communities along
religious lines, especially if the disruption arises annually due to the need for
continued legislative appropriations. Analysis of the judicial opinions in this
area indicates that the reasonable accommodations requirement does not have
these effects.
7
8
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Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 559 (6th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id. at 552.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
Id. at 613.
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A. Administrative Entanglement
The Court first discussed administrative entanglement when it upheld state
property tax exemptions for religious organizations in Walz v. Tax Commission."
The majority emphasized that state taxation and the confrontation which would
result from tax valuation of church property, tax liens, and tax foreclosures
would involve greater church-state entanglement than a general property tax
exemption.

13

The first programs struck down because of excessive entanglement were
two state plans to aid nonpublic schools, which the Court invalidated in Lemon
v. Kurtzman. 4 The constitutional objection to the plans was based in part upon
the provision for state examination of the accounting records of religious organizations designed to distinguish religious from secular expenditures. Chief Justice
Burger warned that such surveillance and control measures were inherent in
government subsidy programs and resulted in "an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state." 5 Other state schemes to aid nonpublic
schools have been declared fatally flawed for similar reasons.' "
Not all government involvement in.financing results is excessive entanglement. The Court upheld federal construction grants to church-related colleges
and universities in Tilton v. Richardson.' The plurality opinion there argued
that since these grants were given but once for a single purpose, entanglement
was reduced. There was no need for continuing government separation of religious from secular expenditures, no annual audits were required, and no continuing financial relationship was established.' s
The reasonable accommodation requirement, codified as 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-(j), does not involve government in the financial affairs of religion. Government makes no payment to any religious institutions; thus no government
financial surveillance is necessary. In fact, government and religious organizations would come into contact, if at all, only in the courtroom. This might become necessary if a plaintiff claimed the protection of § 2000e-(j), and the
question was raised whether the alleged belief was "religious" within the meaning of the law. Testimony would then be necessary to establish the religious
nature of the belief.
The dissent in Cummins suggested that government inquiry into the religious nature of an employee's belief might result in excessive entanglement.' 9
This objection is not well-based in either the decided cases or logic. The Court
has decided numerous cases which necessitate determining whether a belief is

12 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

13 Id. at 674.
14 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
15 Id. at 622.
16 Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Public Funds for Pub. Schools Inc. v.
Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973) (alternative holding), aff'd mem., 417 U.S. 961
(1974).
17 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
18 Id. at 688.
19 516 F.2d 544, 559 (6th Cir. 1975).
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religious. In Sherbert v. Verner," South Carolina was barred from denying
unemployment compensation benefits to a worker who refused available employment because it involved working on the Sabbath, which her religion prohibited.
There is, however, nothing in that decision to prevent the state from withholding
benefits from workers who refuse suitable employment for secular reasons. The
Court implicitly recognized the possible necessity of a judicial determination of
the character of the worker's belief, since only a religious motivation would justify
refusing employment. A similar determination is implicit in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.2 There, the state's interest in compulsory education was compelled on
free exercise grounds to accommodate the religious tenets of the Amish. Since
no accommodation is necessary if the conflicting belief is not religious, these
cases argue against the contention that a judicial characterization of the nature
of a belief involves excessive government entanglement.
Furthermore, the logical result of the dissent's contention would preclude
enforcement of any congressional legislation prohibiting religious discrimination.
Unless a court was required to accept the aggrieved party's characterization of
his own belief, all litigation on the issue would involve excessive entanglement.
If courts attempted to determine the 4ature of a belief, then the establishment
clause would be violated; but if the evaluation were precluded, then any belief
which a party chose to term "religious" would be entitled to protection. Thus
the argument that courts cannot constitutionally determine if a belief is religious
proves too much.
B. Potential Political Divisiveness
The Court has repeatedly cautioned that state and local political activity
engendered by legislation such as aid programs for nonpublic schools is a potential hazard to the normal political process. 2 It tends to divide the electorate
along religious lines and therefore to "confuse and obscure other issues of great
urgency."2 And the divisions which result from initially securing the passage
of the initial legislation are deepened when annual appropriations are necessary.
The first amendment was intended to guard against this danger.24
Section 2000e-(j) does not foster this political divisiveness. It does not
require additional annual appropriations, since enforcement is vested primarily
with the EEOC, a pre-existing, funded body with considerable responsibilities
beyond § 2000e-(j).25 Furthermore, the Court has never sustained this objection
to federal legislation, since the danger apparently is greater at the state and local
levels. Therefore, the reasonable accommodations requirement has little potential for causing political divisions along religious lines.
Entanglement, however, is only one of three obstacles which the reason20 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
21 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
22 Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971).
24 Id.
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(g) (Supp. II,
1972).
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able accommodations requirement must overcome to withstand a constitutional
challenge. Since it does not involve administrative and political entanglement,
discussion must turn to its legislative history to determine if it is supported by
the necessary secular legislative purpose. 6
III. Legislative Purpose
The legislative history of § 2000e-(j), when viewed in light of the decided
cases, supports two conclusions: (1) the sponsor of the amendment was principally concerned with easing the problems of members of Sabbatarian religious
sects who were forced to choose between employment and observation of the
Sabbath according to the tenets of their faith; (2) his religious concern alone is
probably insufficient to require the invalidation of the law.
Section 2000e-(j) did not evoke extended legislative comment. It was
added on the floor of the Senate by West Virginia Senator Jennings Randolph."'
The CongressionalRecord gives a clear indication of his intention, but is silent
as to the purpose of other legislators.
Senator Randolph clearly intended to require at least that employers show
that they made or attempted to make a reasonable accommodation of the employee's religious practice in order to justify the discharge of or failure to hire
an employee or potential employee who, for religious reasons, could not work
times scheduled by the employer.28 The Senator's remarks show special concern
for the diminishing membership in some religious organizations.
There has been a partial refusal at times on the part of employers to hire
or to continue in employment employees whose religious practices rigidly
require them to abstain from work in the nature of hire on particular days.
So there has been, because of understandable pressures, such as commitments
of a family nature and otherwise, a dwindling of the membership of some
of the religious organizations
because of the situation to which I have just
29
directed attention.
Any remaining doubt as to Senator Randolph's intention is dispelled by
examining the cases included in the extention of his remarks in light of his belief
that judicial implementation of first amendment freedoms had been inadequate.
He prefaced his speech to the Senate with the assertion that although freedom
from religious discrimination has been considered a fundamental right, "our
courts have on occasion determined that this freedom is nebulous.""0 Following
his address, the Senator included the text of two federal court decisions. 1 Each
decision rejected the plaintiffs claim that the employer was in violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he had failed to accommodate the religious
26 Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
107 (1968).
27 118 CONG. Rnc. 705-31 (1972) (remarks of Senator Randolph).
28 Id. at 706.
29 Id. at 705.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 706-13.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[February 1976]

practice of the plaintiff. Both courts argued that Congress did not intend that
reasonable accommodations be required, and therefore failure to do so was not
contrary to the Act. 2 It is clear that Senator Randolph added this section precisely to show that Congress did intend to place this burden on employers.
Senator Randolph's purpose in adding the section may not by itself cause
invalidation of the amendment. 3 While it is true that lack of a secular legislative
purpose is theoretically fatal, the Court has seldom relied on the legislative purpose to strike down a challenged law. Indeed, the Court seemingly indulges every
presumption that the legislative purpose was proper. In the Sunday closing law
cases,34 the Court held that the legislative purpose was valid in providing for a
uniform day of rest. It reached this conclusion in spite of the historical connection between Sunday closing laws and religious observances, and the fact that
one section of one law was cloaked in terms of "profain[mg] the Lord's day."35
In upholding state property tax exemptions granted religious organizations, the
Court approved the broad legislative objective of avoiding inhibiting "certain
entities that exist in a harmonious relationship with the community at large."36
Even several programs to aid nonpublic schools, although held unconstitutional
on other grounds, were recognized as having valid secular purposes, i.e., advancement of secular education, promotion of pluralism and diversity, concern about
overcrowding in public schools should nonpublic schools fail, and preservation
of a safe and healthy educational environment for all schoolchildren." Only
the prohibition against teaching the theory of evolution in Epperson v. Arkansas"8 and the prayer in public school case of Abington School District v.
Schempp39 were invalidated because of an impermissible legislative purpose.
Add to this general legislative deference the fact that the intention of the
434 other legislators is unknown, and it is doubtful that Senator Randolph's
intention alone would necessitate the invalidation of the law.
The reasonable accommodation requirement, then, is likely to avoid censure
on either excessive entanglement or legislative purpose grounds. The final question is whether its principal or primary effect can withstand the challenge of
the first amendment.
IV. Principal Effect
Even a law supported by a secular legislative purpose violates the establishment clause if its primary or principal effect is the advancement of religion. 0
32 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970); Riley v. Bendix Corp.,
330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D.Fla. 1971).
33 Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 1975).
34 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
35 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 448 (1961), citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 492 (1971).
36 Walz v. Tax Conm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
37 Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
38 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
39 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973).
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The reasonable accommodations requirement advances religion to the extent
that, by forcing employers to make a special effort to resolve the work-related
confficts of religious employees, it makes the practice of religion more convenient.
To be constitutionally permissible this aid must fall into either of two categories.
First, assistance is not objectionable if it is incidental to the uniform application
of public welfare legislation. Second, assistance in the form of an exemption
from the operation of a restrictive law is not objectionable where failure to grant
the exemption results in an abridgement of the right of free exercise of religion.
After outlining these two principles, the effect of § 2000e-(j) will be analyzed
to determine whether it is supported by either of them.
A. Public Welfare Legislation
If government chooses to confer a benefit to all persons meeting nonreligious
criteria, that benefit cannot be denied by reason of religious belief, even though
religion is indirectly assisted thereby. The Supreme Court applied this rule in
Everson, v. Board of Education.1 Discussing the meaning of the free exercise
and establishment clauses, Justice Black wrote:
Consequently [New Jersey] cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or
the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.12
He concluded that the first amendment did not proscribe the use of state tax
dollars to reimburse parents of children attending parochial schools for bus fares
to and from school as part of a general program which similarly benefited
children in public and other schools. Although the Court recognized that this
program might encourage attendance at church-related schools by making it less
expensive, it held that this impetus was no more direct, and therefore no more
impermissible, than that which results from providing these schools with police
and fire protection.43
The majority opinion in Board of Education v. Allen44 relied on this principle to uphold a New York statute which extended to nonpublic schoolchildren
an existing public school student textbook loan program. Unlike Everson, the
program in Allen did not involve a health and safety measure analogous to police
and fire protection, yet the Court applied the same reasoning. Since this was
merely the extension of public welfare legislation to all schoolchildren, and the
benefit to religion was no more direct than in Everson, the measure was upheld.45
Similar reasoning supported the decision in Sherbert v. Verner."' The majority held that absent a compelling state interest, South Carolina could not deny a
worker unemployment compensation benefits because she refused to accept avail41
42
43
44
45
46

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 16 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 17-18.
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Id. at 243-44.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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able employment which required work on the Sabbath contrary to her religious
beliefs. Unlike the decisions in Everson and Allen, the Sherbert decision necessitated recognizing an exemption to the law, inasmuch as persons who turned
down otherwise suitable employment because they had insufficient secular objections to working on Saturdays were disqualified from these benefits."' The
majority ruled that withholding the benefits violated the free exercise clause since
it had the same effect as a state-imposed fine on the appellant for practicing her
faith. The Court argued that this exemption did not violate the establishment
clause because it merely made the benefits of public welfare legislation available
to all, instead of withholding them from some people for religious reasons.'
Although religion might be incidentally advanced, this indirect assistance was not
found impermissible.
B. Exemption from Restrictive Laws
If government creates a general burden or restriction affecting all who meet
nonreligious criteria, the free exercise clause may require that some persons be
exempted because of the law's detrimental effect on the practice of their religion.
Free exercise does not constitutionally require an exemption if the restriction only
makes religious practice more burdensome. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market 9 and Braunfeld v. Brown" involved laws which forced the closing of the
appellants' places of business on Sunday, even though the stores were already
closed on Saturday for religious reasons. The Court reasoned that since the laws
did not prohibit the practice of the appellants' faith, but only made it more expensive, exemption from the law was not necessary. 1 However, if the law prohibits a religious practice, a different rule applies.
Where the restrictive state action either prohibits a religious practice or
requires conduct offensive to religious tenets, the Court has applied a balancing
test. In order to justify the detriment to the religious practitioner, the state must
show that it has an overriding interest. In Reynolds v. United States,52 the Court
held that society's long-standing interest in monogamy vindicated state laws
against polygamy, even though they were oppressive to the practice of the
Mormon faith. On the other hand, in Wisconsin v. Yoder 3 the Court ruled that
the state's interest in compulsory education to age 16 did not justify requiring
Amish parents to violate their faith by sending their children to school beyond
the eighth grade. Because the contrary conclusion "would gravely endanger if
not destroy the free exercise of respondent's religious beliefs,"54 the religious
interest outweighed Wisconsin's concern with two additional years of formal education.
Interpretation of the draft-exemption for conscientious objectors also in47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 401.
Id. at 410.
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
Id. at 605; 366 U.S. 617, 631 (1961).
98 U.S. 145 (1878).

53 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
54

Id. at 219.
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volved application of a balancing test. Whether the Government could justify
requiring participation in war contrary to religious beliefs against involvement
in all war has never been decided, since Congress has provided for such an exemption. But in Gillette v. United States,55 the Court decided the question of
whether the Government could draft those who, for religious reasons, objected
only to participation in unjust wars. The majority argued that granting such
an exemption would involve new administrative difficulties which might cause
the conscription laws to appear unfair. The burden placed on the appellant's
rAligion was justified by the substantial government interest in promoting public
confidence in the administration of the draft laws."0
C. The Effect of § 2000e-(j)
The assistance given religion by the reasonable accommodation requirement
is qualitatively different from either that which is incidental to uniform distribution of public welfare benefits or that which is necessary to avoid abridgement
of the right of free exercise. Unlike the former, it creates a class of beneficiaries
which excludes all nonreligious workers. Unlike the latter, the burden which
would otherwise complicate the practice of religion is only inconvenience.
The cases which involved public welfare legislation have one common
element: the same benefits were given to all who met the secular criteria. All
parents who met the nonreligious criteria of having children attending school
were reimbursed for the transportation expenses of those children." All schoolchildren were loaned textbooks." All unemployed workers received compensation benefits unless they failed to meet secular criteria.59 The reasonable accommodations requirement, however, does not distribute benefits based on
secular criteria.
Use of religious criteria to distribute benefits has not been found objectionable where both religious and nonreligious persons can be assisted. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964's prohibition against religious discrimination is one example.
Certainly it protects a religious worker denied employment because of his faith,
but it also protects the nonreligious worker denied employment because of his
lack of faith.6 The reasonable accommodations requirement does not provide
this equal advantage.6" Section 2000e-(j) requires that an employer show that
55 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
56 Id. at 460.
57 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
58 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
59 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
60 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 434 (EEOC Dec. No. 72-0528, 1971); 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
842 (EEOC Dec. No. 72-1114, 1972).
61 The reasonable accommodations test has been applied in a case involving an atheist
worker, but that interpretation seems clearly in error. The court implied that a discriminatory
practice, forcing an unwilling employee to attend an entire business meeting begun with a
religious observance, might be justified by showing an undue burden on the conduct of the
business. Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975).
The effect is to read § 2000e-(j) as a limitation on the general prohibition against religious
discrimination. This does not seem justified in light of the legislative history as outlined in
Part III of this note. Earlier decisions indicate that the practice is discriminatory without
regard to the effect on business. See 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 434 (EEOC Dec. No. 72-0528,
1971); cf. 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 842 (EEOC Dec. No. 72-1114, 1972).
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he attempted to accommodate an employee who refused to work on Saturday
for religious reasons in order to justify the discharge of that worker for not working scheduled days.62 If the nonreligious worker refuses Saturday work, the
employer has no corresponding statutory obligation to attempt any concessions.
The nonreligious workers cannot benefit because they have no protectible
religious practices or observances.
Laws which conferred benefits only to religious groups because of their
religion have consistently been either struck down or interpreted so as
to avoid a discriminatory effect. In Welsh v. United States,6 3 the Court interpreted "religious training and belief" in § 6 of the Universal Military Training
and Service Act to include moral and ethical as well as religious beliefs if held with the strength of traditional religious beliefs.6" This tortured reading was
apparently necessary to save the conscientious objector exemption from invalidation on grounds of the establishment clause."5 In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,66 the Court struck down a state plan which provided partial tuition grants to parents of children attending church-related schools. The majority
argued inter alia that because the grants were given in addition to the right of
parents to send their children to public schools at state expense, the law had the
effect of granting special benefits to nonpublic sectarian institutions.6 7 In a companion case, Sloan v. Lemon,6" a state tuition reimbursement plan which authorized payments to parents of children attending nonpublic schools was held
violative of the establishment clause. Justice Powell wrote for six members of
the Court:
We think it plain that this is quite unlike the sort of "indirect" and "incidental" benefits that flowed to sectarian schools from programs aiding
all parents by supplying bus transportation and secular textbooks for their
children. Such benefits were carefully restricted to the secular side of
church-affiliated institutions and provided
no special aid for those who had
69
chosen to support religious schools.

Because it creates a class of beneficiaries limited to religious workers, the reason62 Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d, 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
63 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
64 Id. at 339-40.
65 Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, gave this explanation of Justice Black's controlling opinion. Id. at 344-67.
66 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
67 Id. at 783. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, argued that because the grants
were given in addition to the right to attend public schools at state expense, they did more
than merely equalize the benefits to all parents. This does not convincingly distinguish Everson
and Allen from the present case. The parents involved in the earlier cases also had the right
to send their children to public schools and thereby benefit from the transportation reimbursements and textbook loans. Perhaps Justice Powell recognized this weakness because he
was compelled to further defend the majority's position. "And in any event, the argument
[that the tuition grants were analogous to the transportation reimbursements and textbook
loans and therefore valid] proves too much, for it would also provide a basis for approving
through tuition grants the complete subsidization of all religious schools on the ground that
such action is necessary if the State is fully to equalize the position of parents who elect such
schools-a result wholly at variance with the Establishment Clause." Id. at 782 n.38 (emphasis
supplied).
68 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
69 Id. at 832 (emphasis supplied).
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able accommodations requirement cannot be justified by claiming that it confers
only an incidental benefit to religion pursuant to the uniform application of
public welfare legislation.
However, the exemption which the Court required in Wisconsin v. Yoder
did involve a special benefit granted for religious reasons only to religious persons.
The exemption was required because application of the particular restrictive law
involved would have abridged the free exercise of religion.7 Section 2000e- (j) is
not an exemption from a restrictive law. If the practice of religion is more difficult in the absence of government-enforced reasonable accommodations, it is
because of contractual rules devised-by private employers, not because the Government has taken some affirmative action which interfered with free exercise.
Furthermore, the interference here is different from that in the free exercise case,
where an exemption was required. The Amish parent in Yoder v. Wisconsin"'
faced government sanctions against the practice of his faith while a religious
worker, in the absence of the reasonable accommodations requirement, is only inconvenienced. Either he makes a private arrangement with a willing employer
or he finds other work which is better suited to his religious needs. Like the businessman in Braunfeld v. Brown," religious practice is perhaps made more expensive, but is not prohibited. For these reasons, the government-enforced preference
which results from the reasonable accommodations requirement is not justified
by the free exercise clause.
V. Conclusion
The reasonable accommodations requirement passes the first two tests required to survive an establishement clause challenge, but it fails the third. Even
though it avoids excessive entanglement between government and religion, and
probably would not be invalidated for having an impermissible purpose, its effect
is not neutral with respect to religion. Because it confers special benefits only to
religious workers, which are not necessary to preserve the right to free exercise, a
decision upholding the reasonable accommodations requirement would be in.
conflict with the decided cases.
William A. Chenoweth

70
71
72

Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id.
366 U.S. 599 (1961).

